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SPEECH AS A WEAPON: PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. 
AMERICAN COALITION OF LIFE ACTIVISTS AND THE NEED 
FOR A REASONABLE LISTENER STANDARD 
Alex J. Berkman
* **
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 31, 2009, Dr. George Tiller was shot and killed at his 
church in Kansas.1  Prior to his death, Dr. Tiller, one of the nation‘s 
only late-term abortion providers, was regularly targeted by anti-
abortion extremist groups.2  Along with other physicians, Dr. Tiller 
had been the target of violence and the subject of ―Wanted‖ and 
―Unwanted‖ posters on anti-abortion websites.3  In addition to offers 
of rewards for personal information on abortion providers, the web-
sites published, and continue to publish, the so-called ―Nuremberg 
Files.‖4  The Nuremberg Files consist of a list of names displayed us-
ing different typefaces to signify whether the doctors, clinic workers, 
or judges remained alive––normal lettering signified the doctor was 
alive, grey signified he or she had been injured, and a line through the 
 
                                                                                                                                       
* J.D. Candidate 2013, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg School of Law; B.A. 2009, Stony 
Brook University.  I would like to thank Professor Eileen Kaufman for all of her assistance 
with this Comment. 
** Please note some of the following footnotes may contain Internet sources depicting expli-
cit content. 
1 Robin Abcarian & Nicholas Riccardi, Abortion Doctor Fatally Shot; George Tiller Had 
Long Been Targeted Over Late-Term Procedures, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 2009, at C10. 
2 Id. 
3 Id.; see also Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of 
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1063-67 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (listing physicians who had 
been murdered pursuant to ―Wanted‖ posters describing each as an abortionist); Alleged Ab-
ortionists and Their Accomplices: Tiller the Killer Aborted!, THE CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS 
SERV., http://christiangallery.com/atrocity/aborts.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2013) (naming 
abortionists who were either wounded or murdered). 
4 See Alleged Abortionists and Their Accomplices, supra note 3 (displaying the informa-
tion contained in the Nuremberg Files). 
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name meant that he or she was dead.5 
Four Oregon physicians and two clinics sought judicial inter-
vention against the American Coalition of Life Activists (―ACLA‖), 
the anti-abortion extremist group that began the use of ―Wanted‖ 
posters and the Nuremberg Files while advocating the use of violence 
in pursuing its cause.6  In Planned Parenthood of the Colum-
bia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists,7
 
the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed a permanent injunction and an award of compensato-
ry damages against the ACLA.8  In reaching its decision, the court 
looked to the history of violence in the anti-abortion movement and 
the nature of the statements in question.9  The court emphasized that 
the violent history of the movement, specifically targeting physicians 
and clinics, converted otherwise innocuous statements into intention-
al threats and intimidation under the Freedom of Access to Clinic En-
trances Act (―the FACE Act‖).10 
Context, thus, plays a role in the determination of whether a 
statement targeting an individual or group of individuals is protected 
by the First Amendment, but such classification largely depends on 
the standard of review applied.11  In Planned Parenthood, the Ninth 
Circuit applied a reasonable speaker standard, an objective test rely-
ing on whether a reasonable person in the speaker‘s position would 
consider the statement to be threatening.12  Although the reasonable 
speaker standard led the Ninth Circuit to render the correct decision 
in Planned Parenthood, it is inherently flawed.  Opinions regarding 
abortion, one of the most divisive issues in America, can vary widely 
based on geography.13  This lack of uniformity in opinion leads to a 
 
                                                                                                                                       
5 Id. 
6 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1062. 
7 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). 
8 Id. at 1088. 
9 Id. at 1083. 
10 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2006). 
11 E.g., United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072 (6th Cir. 2001); Bauer v. Sampson, 261 
F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2000); Metz v. Dep‘t 
of the Treasury, 780 F.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
12 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1074, 1076. 
13 See Lydia Saad, Repulicans‟, Dems‟ Abortion Views Grow More Polarized: Republi-
cans Have Grown More Conservative on Abortion Since 1975; Democrats, More Liberal, 
GALLUP (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/126374/Republicans-Dems-Abortion-
Views-Grow-Polarized.aspx (illustrating ―Americans‘ views on the extent to which abortion 
should be legal‖ by comparing the outlook of Democrats and Republicans from the years 
2
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legitimate concern that one who believes abortion is wrong in all cir-
cumstances may consider one‘s effort to end a physician‘s practice 
through threats justified.  That risk based on one‘s opinion of abor-
tion shows the need for a more concrete, static standard of review.14 
This Comment will propose the adoption of a reasonable lis-
tener standard, rather than the oft-applied reasonable speaker stan-
dard, through an analysis of Supreme Court decisions, the Ninth Cir-
cuit‘s reasoning in Planned Parenthood, and an overview of the 
violent history stemming from the anti-abortion extremist movement.  
The reasonable listener standard would focus on whether a reasona-
ble person in the target‘s place would consider the statements made 
by anti-abortion extremist groups to be intentionally threatening.  
Section II will discuss the anti-abortion movement‘s history of vi-
olence, including the murder of abortion providers and terrorist acts 
targeting women‘s health clinics, and the continued use of violent 
rhetoric by groups similar to the ACLA.  Section III will focus on the 
history of free speech limitations and the importance of a historical 
context in determining whether arguably threatening speech may be 
prohibited.  Section IV will examine the importance and impact of 
the Ninth Circuit‘s opinion in Planned Parenthood.  Section V will 
argue for the adoption of a reasonable listener standard by courts 
which decide cases involving the use of targeted, threatening rhetoric.  
Section VI will discuss the shortcomings of the FACE Act as well as 
suggest changes to increase accountability for the use of threatening 
rhetoric. 
 
 
1975 to 2009); Lydia Saad, Common State Abortion Restrictions Spark Mixed Reviews, 
GALLUP (July 25, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148631/common-state-abortion-
restrictions-spark-mixed-reviews.aspx (showing how some Americans favor specific types 
of abortion restriction laws, but oppose others—―[m]ost Americans favor abortion consent 
laws; oppose clinic funding bans, late-term abortions‖); RealClearPolitics Electoral College, 
REAL CLEAR POL., http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/maps/obama_vs_mccain/ (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2013) (demonstrating the 2008 presidential election results by state).  One‘s 
opinion of abortion in relation to an identified political affiliation along with election results 
establish a correlation between a state and the population‘s assumed perspective on abortion.  
Id. 
14 See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1088 (finding that the ―Wanted‖ posters naming 
the abortionists posed a true threat).  The court noted that ―ACLA and physicians knew of 
this, and both understood the significance of the particular posters specifically identifying 
each of them.  ACLA realized that ‗wanted‘ or ‗guilty‘ posters had a threatening meaning 
that physicians would take seriously.‖  Id.  
3
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II. THE RECENT HISTORY OF VIOLENT ACTS AND ASSOCIATED 
INTERNET THREATS AGAINST ABORTION PROVIDERS 
Since 1993, the anti-abortion movement has been closely 
connected with extreme acts of violence, including abortion clinic 
bombings, shootings, and murder.15  On March 10, 1993, Dr. David 
Gunn was shot and killed from behind by Michael Frederick Griffin 
outside of an abortion clinic in Pensacola, Florida.16  In August of 
that same year, Dr. George Patterson was shot and killed after his 
name and personal information had been circulated on ―Wanted‖ 
posters.17 
In July 1994, Paul Hill, a member of Defensive Action, an an-
ti-abortion extremist group, shot three people at a Florida abortion 
clinic.18  Hill killed Dr. John Bayard Britton and his bodyguard, 
James Herman Barrett, and injured Barrett‘s wife.19  When police ar-
rested Hill, who was later found guilty and sentenced to death, he told 
police, ―I know one thing, no innocent babies are going to be killed in 
that clinic today.‖20  At his sentencing hearing, a woman in the cour-
troom gallery shouted, ―This man is innocent and his blood will be on 
your hands and the hands of the jury!‖21  Hill would go on, while 
awaiting execution and even following his death, to become a cele-
brity in the anti-abortion movement.22 
 
                                                                                                                                       
15 See id. at 1063-66 (examining the murders of several physicians as a result of ―Wanted‖ 
posters by anti-abortionists); Richard Fausset, A History of Violence on the Fringe; Tiller‟s 
Slaying Continues a Decades-long Campaign by Extremists Among Abortion Opponents, 
L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A11 (―Bombings.  Butyric acid attacks.  Sniper shootings.  Let-
ters filled with fake anthrax.  These are some of the tactics used over the years by antiabor-
tion extremists.‖); Abcarian & Riccardi, supra note 1 (recounting violent acts performed by 
those in the anti-abortion movement). 
16 Eric Harrison & David G. Savage, Doctor‟s Killing Raises Fears for Abortion Groups, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A1. 
17 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1064. 
18 William Claiborne, Two Killed at Clinic in Florida: Radical Abortion Foe Charged in 
Shootings, WASH. POST, July 30, 1994, at A1. 
19 Id.; Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of the First 
Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1175, 1192 (2000). 
20 Claiborne, supra note 18 (internal quotation marks omitted); William Booth, Abortion 
Clinic Slayer Is Sentenced to Death, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1994, at A1. 
21 Booth, supra note 20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
22 See, e.g., The Paul Hill, CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS SERV., 
http://www.christiangallery.com/PaulHillWarningLinks.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) 
(memorializing Hill as a hero for his violent acts in the name of the unborn). 
4
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One month later, Dr. George Tiller was shot in both arms by 
Rachelle Shannon outside the Women‘s Health Care Services Clinic 
in Wichita, Kansas, where he worked as one of the few late-term 
abortion providers in the United States.23  Dr. Tiller returned to work 
the next day.24  At trial, Shannon stated that she shot Dr. Tiller be-
cause she was ―concerned about innocent, helpless babies being 
killed by other people who won‘t stop unless somebody stops them,‖ 
and that though she did not intend to kill him, ―it would have been 
right either way to try to stop what he‘s doing.‖25  In December 1994, 
two receptionists and five other people were injured when John Salvi 
fired a rifle at two clinics in the Boston, Massachusetts, area.26 
Towards the end of January 1998, several people were injured 
and a police officer was killed when a bomb exploded outside of a 
Birmingham, Alabama, clinic.27  Eric Rudolph later confessed to the 
clinic bombing as well as the Atlanta Olympic Bombing of 1996.28  
On October 23, 1998, James Kopp fired a high-powered assault rifle 
into the Buffalo, New York, home of Dr. Barnett Slepian.29  During a 
jailhouse interview, Kopp claimed that he intended to wound Dr. Sle-
pian with the sniper attack, but inadvertently killed him when ―the 
bullet took a crazy ricochet.‖30  Kopp also stated that he did not regret 
shooting Dr. Slepian, but that he regretted the doctor‘s death.31  ―To 
pick up a gun and aim it at another human being and to fire, it‘s not a 
human thing to do . . . .  The only thing that would be worse, to me, 
would be to do nothing, and to allow abortions to continue.‖32 
 
                                                                                                                                       
23 Abortion Foe Who Shot a Doctor Is Convicted of Attempted Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
26, 1994, § 1, at 7; Abcarian & Riccardi, supra note 1. 
24 Lianne Hart & J. Michael Kennedy, Woman Charged After Abortion Doctor Is Shot; 
Violence: Oregon Activist Is Arrested in Oklahoma After the Wichita Attack. Physician Re-
turns to Clinic, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1993, at A1.  The shooting occurred less than one week 
after a local pastor attempted to publish an advertisement stating that killing of abortion pro-
viders was ―justifiable homicide.‖  Id. 
25 Abortion Foe Who Shot a Doctor Is Convicted of Attempted Murder, supra note 23 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  
26 Abcarian & Riccardi, supra note 1. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Militant Confesses to „98 Sniper Killing of Abortion Doctor, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 21, 2002, 
at N21. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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On May 31, 2009, almost fifteen years after Dr. Tiller was 
shot in both arms at his clinic and after continued efforts to stop his 
practice, Scott Roeder killed Dr. Tiller by shooting him in the head at 
point-blank range in the Wichita, Kansas, church that the doctor at-
tended.33  At his trial for the murder of Dr. Tiller, Roeder explained 
that in 1993 he realized that murdering Dr. Tiller, or other physicians 
who performed abortions, was a means to stop abortions, a practice 
he viewed as murder.34  Roeder was sentenced to life in prison.35  As 
he was escorted out of the courtroom following his sentencing hear-
ing, Roeder shouted at the presiding judge that ―[t]he blood of babies 
is on your hands!‖36  From his jail cell, before his conviction, Roeder 
told a reporter, ―I know there are many other similar events planned 
around the country as long as abortion remains legal,‖ but refused to 
elaborate on what he meant by the statement.37 
Besides their profession, the murdered physicians had one 
thing in common: in each case, the murder victim had been displayed 
in the Nuremberg Files, or on ―Wanted‖ posters distributed by anti-
abortion extremist groups offering rewards for information about the 
doctors and stating that they were guilty of mass murder and must be 
stopped.38
 
 In 1998, within hours after Dr. Slepian was shot and killed 
in his home, the Christian Gallery News Service, the website that 
publishes the Nuremberg Files, put a line through the doctor‘s 
name.39 
 
                                                                                                                                       
33 Abortion Foe Who Shot a Doctor Is Convicted, supra note 23; Robin Abcarian, Abor-
tion Doctor‟s Killer Sentenced to Life in Prison; Activist Defiant As Judge Rules No Parole 
for 50 Years in Slaying at Kansas Church, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 2, 2010, at C12. 
34 Robin Abcarian, Killer Says Church Was Only Option: That Was the One Place He 
Could Get to Abortion Provider George Tiller, He Tells Jurors at His Trial, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
29, 2010, at A20. 
35 Abcarian, Abortion Doctor‟s Killer Sentenced, supra note 33. 
36 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)  (―If I were allowed to display pictures of aborted 
babies as you allowed (pictures of) George Tiller lying in a pool of blood, some of the jury 
might have been persuaded to find me innocent of murder.‖). 
37 Roxana Hegeman, Roeder Says More Violence Planned; Abortion Shooting Suspect 
Contacts AP from Jail Cell, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 8, 2009, at 7 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
38 See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1064-65 (showing the murders resulting from 
―Wanted‖ posters); Alleged Abortionists and Their Accomplices, supra note 3 (noting that 
the lists often include politicians, police officers, and judges, in addition to abortion provid-
ers). 
39 Vitiello, supra note 19, at 1199; Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1065 (stating that the 
Nuremberg Files website opened in January, 1997). 
6
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The Army of God, another anti-abortion extremist group that 
espouses the use of violence, which has been characterized as a ―net-
work of domestic terrorists‖ by the National Abortion Foundation 
and Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, published a manual 
that called for homicide as the only plausible means of ending abor-
tion, and also included a ―how to‖ guide for acts of violence against 
physicians who provide abortions, including arson, making explo-
sives, and butyric acid attacks.40  Michael Bray, the Chaplain of the 
Army of God, who along with two other members served time in 
prison for bombing the offices of the National Abortion Foundation 
and the American Civil Liberties Union in 1984, is credited as author 
of the manual.41  Additionally, the Army of God hosted ―White Rose 
Banquets,‖ an annual event organized by the ACLA in which 
―Wanted‖ posters were often debuted.42  Throughout the Army of 
God website, those convicted of murdering physicians are referred to 
 
                                                                                                                                       
40 See Cell Strategy and Terrorist Groups: Army of God, TERRORISM RES. & ANALYSIS 
CONSORTIUM, http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/cell-strategy-and-terrorist-groups/ 
army-god (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) (―The Army of God is a terror organization located in 
the United States and is committed to stopping abortion.‖); Anti-Abortion Extremists: The 
Army of God and Justifiable Homicide, NAT‘L ABORTION FED‘N, 
http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/violence/army_god.html (last visited Jan. 24, 
2013) (showing that in 1984, the Army of God sent a death threat to Supreme Court Justice 
Harry Blackmun).  Law enforcement first discovered the manual in 1993 at the home of 
Shelly Shannon after she shot Dr. George Tiller in both arms.  Id.  Furthermore, a foreword 
to the manual states the following: 
All of the options have expired.  Our Most Dread Sovereign Lord God 
requires that whosoever sheds man‘s blood, by man shall his blood be 
shed.  Not out of hatred of you, but out of love for the persons you ex-
terminate, we are forced to take arms against you.  Our life for yours—a 
simple equation.  Dreadful.  Sad.  Reality, nonetheless.  You shall not be 
tortured at our hands.  Vengeance belongs to God only.  However, execu-
tion is rarely gentile [sic]. 
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting The Army of God Manual, 
available at http://www.armyofgod.com/AOGsel1.html).  Butyric acid is an odiferous, often-
nauseating liquid that has been referred to as ―vomit-like‖ and is often used in attacks on 
women‘s health clinics to interfere with services and harass those within.  History of Vi-
olence: Butyric Acid Attacks, NAT‘L ABORTION FED‘N, 
http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/violence/butyric_acid.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 
2013).  Between January 1991 and July 1998, butyric acid was used in attacks on clinics 
more than sixty times.  Id. 
41 Army of God and Justifiable Homicide, supra note 40. 
42 See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1065 (noting that many doctors felt apprehensive 
after ―Wanted‖ posters were released at the White Rose Banquets); Army of God and Justifi-
able Homicide, supra note 40 (naming Michael Bray from the Army of God as the ―host of 
the annual White Rose Banquets‖). 
7
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as ―heroes who stood up for the unborn,‖ and the murders they com-
mitted are characterized as justified and appropriate.43  On June 19, 
2009, Bray published a biblically themed diatribe discussing who was 
to blame for Tiller‘s murder, which clearly showed the intent of the 
Army of God‘s actions.44  Bray stated the following: 
Consider the man George Tiller when he saw 
his fate played out in the shooting of abortionists Da-
vid Gunn, John Barrett, and [Barnett] Slepian. . . .  Ra-
ther than reaffirm that these men received the due pu-
nishment of their murderous deeds, Tiller heard those 
who were ostensibly enlightened[,] the putative teach-
ers of Truth and the Law of God by which he would 
one day be judged . . . .  
. . . . 
. . . Of all the places where the blood of Tiller ought to 
be shed, it was most appropriate that it spill in full 
view of his ―brothers‖ and ―sisters‖ who allowed him 
to continue in his sin-filled, blind life.  May his death 
serve as a wake-up call so that others may repent and 
mend their ways.45 
The Army of God did not limit themselves to mere acts of rhetoric; 
among the known-members of the ―underground network‖ are mul-
tiple individuals convicted of murdering physicians or terrorist acts 
targeting clinics.46 
 
                                                                                                                                       
43 ARMY OF GOD, http://www.armyofgod.com (last visited Jan. 24, 2013); see also Mi-
chael Bray, Who Will You Blame?, ARMY OF GOD (June 10, 2009), 
http://www.armyofgod.com/MikeBrayWhoWillYouBlame.html (―[T]he leaders of the ‗pro-
life movement‘ . . . have refused to consistently call abortion murder by affirming the legiti-
macy of justifiable homicide; i.e., the necessary force required to prevent what is called 
murder.‖). 
44 See Bray, supra note 43 (stating that although the pro-life movement regarded the mur-
der of physicians to be wrong, the killing of those who provide abortion is justified). 
45 Id. (emphasis added). 
46 Army of God and Justifiable Homicide, supra note 40.  Known Army of God members 
included: James Kopp, known as ―Atomic Dog‖ within the Army of God, convicted for the 
murder of Dr. Barnett Slepian and suspected in connection with shootings of multiple other 
physicians; Eric Robert Rudolph, convicted in 2003 for bombing a clinic in Alabama; Shel-
ley Shannon, known as ―Shaggy West‖ within the Army of God, convicted for shooting Dr. 
George Tiller in both arms at his clinic in Kansas; Clayton Waagner, convicted in 2003 for 
mailing more than 500 anthrax threats to clinics throughout the United States.  Id. 
8
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Prior to the murders of Doctors Tiller, Gunn, Britton, and Pat-
terson, each was featured on a ―Wanted‖ poster at least once.47  These 
and other ―Wanted‖ posters frequently featured personal information 
such as their home address; their car‘s make, model, and sometimes 
license plate number; and even similar information for their family 
members.48 
III. THE LIMITS OF FREE SPEECH 
Since the early 1900s, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has repeatedly addressed the issue of what types of statements, if any, 
are unprotected by the First Amendment‘s right to free speech.49  Be-
ginning in 1919, the Supreme Court established the clear and present 
danger doctrine in Schenck v. United States,50 which stated that 
speech having the potential to incite acts of hysteria, panic, violent 
action (or other acts that Congress has the right to prohibit) is not 
protected by the First Amendment.51 
The most stringent protection of free speech would not 
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and 
causing a panic.  It does not even protect a man from 
an injunction against uttering words that may have all 
the effect of force.  The question in every case is 
whether the words are used in such circumstances and 
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils 
that Congress has a right to prevent.52 
In Schenck, appellants were convicted under the Espionage Act of 
191753 for distributing literature that called for people to defy military 
 
                                                                                                                                       
47 Michelle Miller, Abortion Docs Decry “Wanted” Posters As Bait, CBS NEWS (Nov. 9, 
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18563_162-6994245.html. 
48 Anti-Abortion Extremists Distribute “Wanted” Posters for Abortion Providers, 
ALTERNET (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.alternet.org/speakeasy/2010/10/21/anti-abortion-
extremists-distribute-wanted-posters-for-abortion-providers/. 
49 U.S. CONST. amend. I (―Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.‖). 
50 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
51 Id. at 52. 
52 Id. (citation omitted). 
53 40 Stat. 217 (1917). 
9
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conscription orders.54  In holding that such speech was not protected, 
the Court stated that because the literature obviously ―had been in-
tended to have some effect, and [the Court did] not see what effect it 
could be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft except to 
influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out,‖ which Congress had 
the power to prevent, it opened the defendants to prosecution.55 
In April and June of 1969, the Supreme Court decided Watts 
v. United States56 and Brandenburg v. Ohio,57 respectively, in which 
the Court refined the clear and present danger doctrine and estab-
lished two new doctrines that work better hand-in-hand as a well de-
fined limitation on free speech.58  In Watts, the petitioner, an eigh-
teen-year-old African-American who had recently been classified ―1-
A‖59 for the draft, was convicted for making threats against the Presi-
dent while discussing the draft with other young people at a rally in 
Washington, D.C.
 60  In that setting, petitioner stated that he refused 
to report to a military physical examination the following week, and 
that ―[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle[,] the first man I want to get 
in my sights is [President Lyndon Baines Johnson].‖61  The Court 
held that although a statement is vitriolic and violent in nature, it is 
not the basis for prosecution unless the statement is a ―true threat.‖62  
Though the Court did not explicitly define what a true threat is, the 
Court did hold that the First Amendment protected petitioner‘s asser-
tion that he refused to honor his draft selection and wanted to shoot 
the President in response.63  The Court explained that when taken in 
 
                                                                                                                                       
54 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49. 
55 Id. at 51. 
56 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
57 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
58 Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08 (―What is a threat must be distinguished from what is consti-
tutionally protected speech. . . . The language of the political arena . . . is often vituperative, 
abusive, and inexact.‖ (citation omitted)); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49 n.4 (―Statutes 
affecting the right of assembly, like those touching on freedom of speech, must observe the 
established distinctions between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless ac-
tion . . . .‖). 
59 See SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., http://www.sss.gov/classif.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2013) 
(defining ―1-A‖ as ―available immediately for military service‖). 
60 Watts, 394 U.S. at 705-06. 
61 Id. at 706.  Others attending the rally that heard petitioner‘s statement responded with 
laughter.  Id. at 707. 
62 Id. at 708 (holding that the government did not prove that the petitioner‘s statement that 
he would shoot the president was an actual or ―true threat‖). 
63 Id. 
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context petitioner‘s statement clearly did not qualify as a true threat.64  
The Court stated: 
We agree with petitioner that his only offense here 
was ―a kind of crude offensive method of stating a po-
litical opposition to the President.‖  Taken in context, 
and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the 
statement and the reaction of the listeners, we do not 
see how it could be interpreted otherwise.65 
Brandenburg reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the 
conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader in Ohio for statements made at a 
rally that were later broadcast on television.66  The Court reasoned 
that any statute infringing upon one‘s freedom of speech could not 
stand unless that statute makes a clear ―distinction[] between mere 
advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action.‖67  Citing cases 
decided after Schenck,68 the Court stated that the clear and present 
danger rule was largely discredited in favor of more protective hold-
ings, favoring the rights of individuals or groups advocating the use 
of violence as a choice in reaching their goals, while not inciting such 
violence.69 
The line between what is permissible and not 
subject to control and what may be made impermissi-
ble and subject to regulation is the line between ideas 
and overt acts. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . [A] prosecution can be launched for the overt acts 
usually caused.  Apart from rare instances of that kind, 
speech is, I think, immune from prosecution.70 
The Court further refined the clear and present danger doctrine, re-
 
                                                                                                                                       
64 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
65 Id. 
66 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45. 
67 Id. at 449 n.4. 
68 E.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 
466 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 
211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
69 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (The clear and present danger doctrine has never been 
expressly overruled.). 
70 Id. at 456-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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placing it with the imminent lawless action doctrine, a test that both 
protects one‘s right to make vitriolic political statements while limit-
ing one‘s right to make statements with the intent to incite violent 
acts.71  The Court held that advocacy must be ―distinguished from in-
citement.‖72  The Court specified that: 
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that 
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free 
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe ad-
vocacy of the use of force or of law violation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or produc-
ing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.73 
The Brandenburg test remains good law, but the Court has 
continued to clarify what types of rhetoric and advocacy may be des-
ignated as non-protected speech.74  In 2003, the Court, in Virginia v. 
Black,75 held a Virginia statute criminalizing the burning of a cross 
for intimidation purposes unconstitutional because the statute allowed 
for the act itself to constitute prima facie evidence of intent to intimi-
date.76 
In Black, three men were convicted under the cross-burning 
statute.77  Barry Black was arrested while leading a Ku Klux Klan ral-
ly.78  Jonathan O‘Mara and Richard Elliot, neither of whom was a 
member of the Ku Klux Klan, were arrested under the same statute 
for attempting to burn a cross on the front lawn of Elliott‘s neighbor‘s 
home, an African-American man.79  At the trials leading to appellees‘ 
convictions, the juries were instructed that they could infer that the 
burning of the cross was prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate 
and that no further mens rea was required.80  On appeal, the Supreme 
 
                                                                                                                                       
71 Id. at 449 & n.4 (per curiam). 
72 Id. at 448-49. 
73 Id. at 447 (emphasis added). 
74 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware 
Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
75 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
76 Id. at 364, 367; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996). 
77 Black, 538 U.S. at 348. 
78 Id. at 348-49. 
79 Id. at 350. 
80 Id. at 349-51. 
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Court of Virginia found the statute ―unconstitutional on its face‖ and 
reversed appellees‘ convictions, stating that the statute had a chilling 
effect and was discriminatory in its focus on cross burning.81 
The Supreme Court of the United States agreed that the sta-
tute was unconstitutional, but declined to follow the lower court‘s 
reasoning on whether Virginia could prohibit and criminalize the 
burning of crosses.82  Noting the long, and often violent, history of 
the Ku Klux Klan, Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor, writing for the ma-
jority, stated that the burning of a cross is often directly associated 
with intimidation tactics and therefore may be the basis of a ―true 
threat,‖ removing any protections afforded by the First Amendment.83  
This history of violence associated with cross burning moved the act 
from a mere political statement to a statement of intimidation or im-
minent violent action, which the Court characterized as an example 
of a ―true threat‖ rendering it unprotected speech.84  Citing Watts and 
Brandenburg, the Court did not explicitly define what a true threat 
was, but did state that it included: 
[T]hose statements where the speaker means to com-
municate a serious expression of an intent to commit 
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual 
or group of individuals. . . . Intimidation in the consti-
tutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of 
true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person 
or group of persons with the intent of placing the vic-
tim in fear of bodily harm or death.85 
Furthermore, the Court held that the language used by Black 
did not constitute a true threat because the burning of a cross at a ral-
ly was not intended to threaten another or incite violence, rendering it 
a mere ―political hyperbole.‖86  In contrast, appellees O‘Mara and El-
liot used the cross burning with the clear intent to intimidate an Afri-
 
                                                                                                                                       
81 Id. at 351. 
82 Black, 538 U.S. at 362. 
83 Id. at 352-57 (―From the inception of the second Klan, cross burnings have been used to 
communicate both threats of violence and messages of shared ideology. . . .  Often, the Klan 
used cross burning as a tool of intimidation and a threat of impending violence.  For exam-
ple, in 1939 and 1940, the Klan burned crosses in front of synagogues and churches.‖). 
84 Id. at 359-60. 
85 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
86 Id. (― ‗[P]olitical hyperbole‘ is not a true threat.‖ (quoting Watts, 394 U.S. at 708)). 
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can-American neighbor.87  The difference between the appellees‘ ac-
tions clearly distinguishes political hyperbole from a true threat.88  
Appellee Black was arrested and convicted under the Virginia anti-
cross burning statute while partaking in a peaceful, though vitriolic 
rally, which expounded anti-African-American and anti-Semitic rhe-
toric.89  On the other hand, appellees O‘Mara and Elliott burned a 
cross on an African-American man‘s property in retaliation.90 
The act of burning a cross may mean that a person is 
engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation.  
But that same act may mean only that the person is 
engaged in core political speech. . . .  
As the history of cross burning indicates, a 
burning cross is not always intended to intimidate.  
Rather, sometimes the cross burning is a statement of 
ideology, a symbol of group solidarity.91 
For this reason, the Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Virginia‘s 
decision to vacate Black‘s conviction, but reversed and remanded 
with regard to O‘Mara and Elliot.92 
The scenario presented in Black parallels the circumstances 
leading to the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Planned Parenthood in 
2002.93  The Ku Klux Klan has a history of grotesque violent acts, as 
well as violently-toned hyperbolic rhetoric.94  Similarly, the anti-
abortion movement, dating back to Roe v. Wade,95 has a history of 
violence and hyperbolic rhetoric.96  When the line between rhetoric 
 
                                                                                                                                       
87 Black, 538 U.S. at 350 (―Their apparent motive was to ‗get back‘ at [the African-
American neighbor] for complaining about the shooting in the backyard.‖). 
88 See id. at 367-68 (―The prima facie evidence provision in this case ignores all of the 
contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning is intended 
to intimidate.  The First Amendment does not permit such a shortcut.‖). 
89 Id. at 348-49. 
90 Id. at 350. 
91 Id. at 365-66. 
92 Black, 538 U.S. at 367-68. 
93 Compare id. (calling for the consideration of context in each determination of a true 
threat), with Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1063-66 (considering actions that when taken 
out of context may constitute political hyperbole, but when in context are clearly true 
threats). 
94 See Black, 538 U.S. at 352-57 (―From the inception of the second Klan, cross burnings 
have been used to communicate both threats of violence and messages of shared ideology.‖). 
95 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
96 See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1063-66 (describing the murders and crimes re-
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 2, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss2/13
2013] SPEECH AS A WEAPON 499 
 
and violence began to blur, as the publication of ―Wanted‖ posters 
were frequently followed by the murder of the physician being tar-
geted, the intent to intimidate and inherent potential for violence fol-
lowing the publication of such statements, similar to the statements 
made when one burns a cross on another‘s property, became clear.97 
IV. PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. AMERICAN COALITION OF LIFE 
ACTIVISTS 
A mere three years before Dr. Tiller was murdered in his 
church, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed a permanent injunction against the ACLA and many other an-
ti-abortion groups, prohibiting the publication of the Nuremberg Files 
and ―Wanted‖ posters.98  The suit was brought by four physicians and 
two clinics under the FACE Act, which provides ―aggrieved persons 
a right of action against whoever by ‗threat of force . . . intentionally  
. . . intimidates . . . any person because that person is or has been . . . 
providing reproductive health services.‘ ‖99  At issue before the Ninth 
Circuit was whether the ACLA‘s actions constituted a true threat and 
therefore were not protected by the First Amendment.100 
The ACLA argued that the trial court erred when it allowed 
the jury to consider the statements in question in a historical context 
because the statements were protected regardless of context.101  ―[The 
ACLA] suggests that the key question for us to consider is whether 
these posters can be considered ‗true threats‘ when, in fact, the post-
ers on their face contain no explicitly threatening language.‖102  Due 
to the lack of a clear intent to threaten through the language of the 
 
sulting from the anti-abortion movement); Vitiello, supra note 19, at 1184 (―[B]ecause Roe 
v. Wade was lawless, and because at some future date, some natural disaster ‗might cause the 
normal order of government to break down,‘ the creators of the [Nuremberg] files began col-
lecting information about abortion providers and their supporters to preserve evidence for 
when they are put on trial for mass murder . . . .‖ (citations omitted)). 
97 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1063-66. 
98 Id. at 1088. 
99 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1062 (alterations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
248 (2006)); see also Hart, 212 F.3d at 1071 (―Congress enacted the FACE Act in 1994 in 
an effort to combat the continuing violence against, and forcible interference with, abortion 
clinics, those providing or receiving abortion-related services, and their families. . . . To this 
end, the FACE Act provides criminal and civil penalties . . . .‖). 
100 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1070. 
101 Id. at 1072. 
102 Id. at 1070-71. 
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―Wanted‖ posters and Nuremberg Files, the ACLA maintained that 
the First Amendment precluded a judgment against them because the 
challenged language was a mere exercise of political speech.103  In re-
sponse, the physicians argued that the statements must be considered 
in a historical context and that the district court did not commit error 
because it limited the amount of historical content submitted to the 
trier of fact.104 
 
A. Origins of the Reasonable Speaker Standard in the 
Ninth Circuit 
Due to the Supreme Court‘s failure to explicitly define what 
constitutes a true threat in Watts, the Ninth Circuit looked to related 
precedents and to the FACE Act to determine what qualifies as a true 
threat.105  The FACE Act does not explicitly state what constitutes a 
threat, but instead defines ―intimidate‖ as an act ―to place a person in 
reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or to 
another.‖106  The Ninth Circuit noted that in Brandenburg, although 
the Court did not clearly describe the line that separates advocacy 
from threatening speech, the Supreme Court did hold that speech ad-
vocating the use of violence is protected, ―so long as the speech is not 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is not 
likely to incite or produce such action.‖107 
To determine whether historical context should bear on the 
analysis, the court looked to Watts and Roy v. United States,108 the 
first speech case the Ninth Circuit decided after the Supreme Court 
decided Watts.109  Based on the Supreme Court‘s consideration of 
context in Watts, the Ninth Circuit summarily rejected the ACLA‘s 
plea to have its statements considered without context.110  ―ACLA‘s 
 
                                                                                                                                       
103 Id. at 1072. 
104 Id. at 1071. 
105 See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1071-74 (examining Supreme Court precedent); 
see, e.g., Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; Watts, 394 U.S. 705; United 
States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1990). 
106 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(3) (2006). 
107 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1071. 
108 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969). 
109 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1074. 
110 Id. at 1074-75. 
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position is that the posters, including the Nuremberg Files, are pro-
tected political speech under Watts, and cannot lose this character by 
context.  But this is not correct.  The Court itself considered context 
and determined that Watts‘s statement was political hyperbole instead 
of a true threat because of context.‖111  Although the Ninth Circuit 
took context into account to determine whether the ACLA‘s conduct 
constituted a true threat or political hyperbole, an objective standard 
of review was still needed.112 
In Roy, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a statement by a 
marine at Camp Pendleton to a phone operator that he was ―going to 
get‖ the President during a visit the following day was a true threat.113  
Roy maintained that the statement was innocuous and did not qualify 
as a threat under 18 U.S.C. § 871,114 the statute prohibiting threats 
against the President of the United States.115  To determine if Roy‘s 
statement constituted a true threat removing it from the protections of 
the First Amendment, the Ninth Circuit adopted a reasonable speaker 
standard.116  The court stated: 
This [c]ourt therefore construes the willfulness 
requirement of the statute to require only that the de-
fendant intentionally make a statement, written or oral, 
in a context or under such circumstances wherein a 
reasonable person would foresee that the statement 
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker 
communicates the statement as a serious expression of 
an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the 
life of the President . . . .117 
In reaching its decision, the court took into account that Roy was a 
marine stationed at Camp Pendleton, that he had ready access to a 
large cache of weapons, and that the President would be arriving at 
the base within a few hours.118  Ultimately, the court affirmed the 
 
                                                                                                                                       
111 Id. at 1072. 
112 Id. at 1074-75. 
113 Roy, 416 F.2d at 875. 
114 18 U.S.C. § 871 (2006). 
115 Roy, 416 F.2d at 876 n.6 (arguing the word ―get‖ did not necessarily imply intent to 
commit a violent act). 
116 Id. at 877-78. 
117 Id. at 877 (emphasis added). 
118 Id. at 878. 
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conviction.119 
 
B. Comparing Circuits and Affirming the Reasonable 
Speaker Standard 
Although the Ninth Circuit had an established standard of re-
view for determining if speech constituted a true threat in Roy, it had 
never applied the standard to a case involving the FACE Act or anti-
abortion activism.120  The Ninth Circuit looked to other circuits‘ deci-
sions in similar cases.121  Noting a split among the circuits on the ap-
plicable standard, the court considered the differences between a rea-
sonable speaker and reasonable listener standard inconsequential.122  
―Although all now apply an objective standard, several circuits have 
a ‗reasonable listener‘ test while others have a ‗reasonable speaker‘ 
test as we do.  The difference does not appear to matter much because 
all consider context, including the effect of an allegedly threatening 
statement on the listener.‖123 
Of the cases cited by the Ninth Circuit, but largely glossed 
over in the decision, United States v. Hart124 is particularly notewor-
thy.  In Hart, appellant J. Fred Hart Jr., ―a self-declared anti-abortion 
activist,‖ was convicted under the FACE Act for parking two Ryder 
cargo trucks in the entrance driveway of two abortion clinics in Little 
Rock, Arkansas, ―rather than an ordinary parking area.‖125  Hart, like 
the ACLA in Planned Parenthood, argued that his actions were pro-
tected under the First Amendment and that parking a cargo truck in 
 
                                                                                                                                       
119 Id. at 879. 
120 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1074. 
121 Id. at 1074-75 n.7. 
122 Id. at 1075 n.7 (noting that seven circuits apply a reasonable listener standard); see, 
e.g., United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Landham, 251 
F.3d 1072 (6th Cir. 2001); Hart, 212 F.3d 1067; United States v. Sovie, 122 F.3d 122 (2d 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059 (4th Cir. 1994); Metz, 780 F.2d 1001; Unit-
ed States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964 (11th Cir. 1983).  The remaining five circuits, including 
the Ninth Circuit, apply a reasonable speaker standard.  See, e.g., United States v. Magleby, 
241 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 1998); 
United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549 
(3d Cir. 1991).  
123 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1075 n.7. 
124 212 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2000). 
125 Id. at 1069-70 (―[E]mployees arriving at the clinics were alarmed by the presence of 
the trucks. . . .  [E]mployees of the clinics feared that the trucks contained bombs.‖). 
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the driveway of an abortion clinic was not a true threat nor a violation 
under the FACE Act.126  The Eighth Circuit, unlike the Ninth, em-
ployed a reasonable listener standard, taking into account multiple 
factors cited by the Supreme Court in Watts to decide if a statement 
constituted a true threat.127  In addition to looking at the statement or 
action in context, the court also considered: 
[H]ow the recipient and other listeners reacted to the 
alleged threat, whether the threat was conditional, 
whether it was communicated directly to its victim, 
whether the maker of the threat had made similar 
statements to the victim on other occasions, and 
whether the victim had reason to believe that the mak-
er of the threat had a propensity to engage in vi-
olence.128 
By taking these factors into account, the Eighth Circuit examined the 
totality of the circumstances in context, as well as how that statement 
affected its recipient.129 
Similarly, in Metz v. Dep‟t of Treasury,130 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explicitly outlined the fac-
tors to be considered when applying the reasonable listener stan-
dard.131  These factors include: ―(1) [t]he listener‘s reactions; (2) [t]he 
listener‘s apprehension of harm; (3) [t]he speaker‘s intent; (4) [a]ny 
conditional nature of the statements; and (5) [t]he attendant circums-
 
                                                                                                                                       
126 Id. at 1069. 
127 Id. at 1071; see also United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying 
the reasonable listener standard to an in-person threat made by an anti-abortion activist to a 
physician). 
128 Hart, 212 F.3d at 1071. 
129 Id. at 1072. 
[O]ur inquiry focuses on whether the jury reasonably could have be-
lieved that parking the Ryder trucks in the clinic driveways, in light of 
the surrounding circumstances, constituted a ―true threat‖ of force.  Giv-
en the context and manner in which Hart placed the Ryder trucks and the 
reaction of clinic staff and patients and others, we conclude that it was 
reasonable for the jury to find that Hart‘s conduct constituted a ―true 
threat‖ of force. 
Id. 
130 780 F.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
131 Metz, 780 F.2d at 1002 (citing Watts as a source of factors). 
19
Berkman: Speech as a Weapon
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
504 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
 
tances.‖132  Without considering these factors in a determination of 
whether a statement constitutes a true threat, the decision fails to ac-
count for the divided opinion on abortion based on geography and 
political affiliation in the United States.133  Dr. Warren Hern, a plain-
tiff in Planned Parenthood who appeared on the Nuremberg Files, 
was quoted by the court as having said that ―[h]e was terrified. . . . 
[He] felt that [it] was . . . a list of doctors to be killed.‖134  If a case 
such as Planned Parenthood were tried in a state where the majority 
of the population‘s perspective of abortion is even minimally in line 
with that of the ACLA, the reasonable speaker standard is dangerous-
ly malleable. 
C. Placing the Merits in Historical Context 
In an exhaustive determination of whether the First Amend-
ment protected the ACLA‘s vitriolic rhetoric, the court examined 
closely the movement‘s history.135  The ACLA and Advocates for 
Life Ministries, another appellant in the case and a group associated 
with the ACLA, were unlike other anti-abortion advocacy groups, in 
that they subscribed to the use of violence to reach their goals.136  
This acceptance of violence as a viable option led to the formation of 
the ACLA.137  The founders of the ACLA were previously members 
of Operation Rescue, which denounces the use of violence to reach 
its goal of ending abortion.138  Following the death of Doctors Griffen 
and Patterson in 1993 and Dr. Britton in 1994, Operation Rescue ex-
plicitly denounced these acts of violence.139  Operation Rescue, 
 
                                                                                                                                       
132 Id. 
133 See Saad, supra note 13 (―Large majorities of Americans favor the broad intent of sev-
eral types of abortion restriction laws that are now common in many states, but have mixed 
or negative reactions to others.‖). 
134 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1091-92 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
135 Id. at 1063-66 (majority opinion). 
136 Id. at 1064. 
137 Id.  (The ACLA split off from Operation Rescue due to a difference in position on the 
use of violent acts to reach its goal.). 
138 Id.; see also History, OPERATION RESCUE, http://www.operationrescue.org/about-
us/history/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (―Operation Rescue led the largest movement involv-
ing peaceful civil disobedience in American history.  During those early years, thousands of 
men and women willingly sat in front of abortion mill doors to prevent the killing of inno-
cent children and paid the penalty in arrest and prosecution on trespassing charges.‖). 
139 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1064. 
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which expressed interest in moving its headquarters to Dr. George 
Tiller‘s clinic three years after he was murdered,140 described itself as 
having ―led the largest movement involving peaceful civil disobe-
dience in American history.‖141  The ACLA on the other hand ―es-
poused a ‗pro-force‘ point of view.‖142  This, along with the bloody 
history associated with the anti-abortion movement, created the his-
torical framework on which the Ninth Circuit relied.143 
In three prior incidents, a ―wanted‖-type poster identi-
fying a specific doctor who provided abortion services 
was circulated, and the doctor named on the poster 
was killed. . . . [The] ACLA realized that “wanted” or 
“guilty” posters had a threatening meaning that phy-
sicians would take seriously.  In conjunction with the 
―guilty‖ posters, being listed on a Nuremberg Files 
scorecard for abortion providers impliedly threatened 
physicians with being next on a hit list.144  
The appearance of physicians on ―Wanted‖ posters prior to their 
murder clearly showed that a reasonable person in the speaker‘s place 
would consider such rhetoric threatening because ―both the actor and 
the recipient get the message.‖145 
V. THE NEED FOR A REASONABLE LISTENER STANDARD 
Although the Ninth Circuit reached the correct decision in 
Planned Parenthood—affirming the permanent injunction and com-
pensatory damages—the court failed to consider the partisanship re-
garding abortion that makes the adoption of a reasonable speaker 
standard categorically incorrect for cases involving such a divisive 
 
                                                                                                                                       
140 Margery Gibbs, Anti-Abortion Group Interested in Buying George Tiller‟s Clinic, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/10/antiabortion-
group-intere_n_213637.html; OPERATION RESCUE, http://www.operationrescue.org/about-
us/history (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (saying that the purchase of the building where Dr. Til-
ler‘s clinic was located forced the operation to close following his murder). 
141 History, OPERATION RESCUE, http://www.operationrescue.org/about-us/history/ (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2013). 
142 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1064. 
143 Id. at 1063-66. 
144 Id. at 1088 (emphasis added). 
145 Id. at 1085. 
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issue.146  Abortion remains one of the most divided issues in America 
as shown in a recent poll finding that more than sixty percent of 
Americans think abortion should be illegal in most, if not all, cir-
cumstances.147  By placing the focus on the party who made the 
statement, the standard of reasonableness has the potential to fluc-
tuate based on time, geography, and politics.148  When dealing with 
an issue as absolutely fundamental as the right to live without fear of 
physical harm or death at the hands of another, the courts should 
adopt a more static standard.  Application of a reasonable listener 
standard provides more certainty and clearer boundaries on what 
speech is protected.  A reasonable person in the shoes of a physician 
who is targeted by an anti-abortion organization which publishes his 
or her personal information in a medium with a clear correlation to 
gruesome murders would undoubtedly be fearful regardless of extra-
neous factors such as geography or the region‘s political leanings. 
The need to apply a reasonable listener standard in a Planned 
Parenthood-like scenario is somewhat unclear in the abstract, but be-
comes apparent when taken in the context of the current and ongoing 
anti-abortion extremist tactics.  For example, the Nuremberg Files 
and ―Wanted‖ posters continue to be published by Neil Horsley, an 
anti-abortion activist who believes domestic terrorism will be the 
force that will shape the future of America and who hosts the Chris-
tian Gallery News Service, a violently toned weblog.149  Along with 
 
                                                                                                                                       
146 See RealClearPolitics Electoral College, supra note 13 (showing the different view-
points on abortion across party lines); Saad, Common State Abortion Restrictions, supra note 
13 (noting the mixed reviews among Americans regarding different abortion laws); Lydia 
Saad, Americans Still Split Along “Pro-Choice,” “Pro-Life” Lines: Majorities Believe Abor-
tion Is Morally Wrong, Legal Access to It Should Be Restricted, GALLUP (May 23, 2011), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/147734/Americans-Split-Along-Pro-Choice-Pro-Life-Lines.aspx 
(finding that over the last twenty years, Americans are divided on the abortion issue based on 
political affiliation, but the majority think that abortion should be illegal in most, if not all 
circumstances); Frank Newport & Lydia Saad, Religion, Politics Inform Americans‟ Views 
on Abortion: Churchgoing Frequency Is Associated with Strength of Anti-Abortion Views, 
GALLUP (Apr. 3, 2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/22222/Religion-Politics-Inform-
Americans-Views-Abortion.aspx (―While Republicans as a whole are more likely than 
Democrats to have anti-abortion views, identifiers with both parties who frequently attend 
church have stronger anti-abortion views than those who attend less frequently.‖). 
147 Saad, Americans Still Split Along “Pro-Choice,” “Pro-Life” Lines, supra note 146. 
148 See RealClearPolitics Electoral College, supra note 13 (illustrating the different views 
on abortion based on location and party affiliation). 
149 Neal Horsley, Talk Is Cheap, CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS SERV., 
http://www.christiangallery.com/pictures.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2013); see also The 
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 2, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss2/13
2013] SPEECH AS A WEAPON 507 
 
targeting abortion providers, Christian Gallery News Service displays 
letters, testimony, and interviews of anti-abortion activists who have 
been convicted of crimes—commonly murder and acts of terror—
against physicians and clinics.150  Christian Gallery News Service al-
so hosts a page titled ―Counter Terrorism List For Abortion Aboli-
tionists,‖ which lists the addresses of convicted and fugitive anti-
abortion terrorists so that other activists, and presumably fans, may 
write to them.151  One of the more disturbing, but not unique, posts on 
the Christian Gallery News Service is a message entitled ―Biblical 
Justice for Baby-Murderers,‖ in which the author, Patrick Johnston, 
explains that ―[k]illing a murderer isn‘t ‗murder‘ any more than ar-
resting a kidnapper is ‗kidnapping.‘ ‖152 
More recently, Pro-Life Nation, an initiative started by Opera-
tion Rescue, ―whose purpose is to implement a comprehensive, uni-
fied, and goal-oriented strategy to end abortion in the United States,‖ 
began hosting a database of ―Wanted‖ poster-style information.153  
The website purports to contain information on more than 700 ―Abor-
 
Propagandist, S. POVERTY L. CTR. INTELLIGENCE REP., Spring 2002, 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2002/spring/the-
propagandist (―The 57-year-old Georgian, [Horsley], warns that ‗domestic terrorism heralds 
the shape of things to come‘ [and] . . . has become the most public face of anti-abortion ex-
tremism in America.‖); Alleged Abortionists and Their Accomplices, supra note 3 (describ-
ing the Ninth Circuit as ―hysterical‖ for finding the Nuremberg Files to be a true threat). 
150 See, e.g., Linda Wolfe & Neal Horsley, Accused Abortion Clinic Attacker Says FBI 
Thinks She Helped Eric Rudolph After He Became a Fugitive, CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS 
SERV. (Mar. 10, 2003), http://www.christiangallery.com/phillips.htm; Neal Horsley, Clay 
Waagner Claims Breakthrough in Necessity Defense: Could Affect Jim Kopp Case, 
CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS SERV. (Dec. 6, 2002), 
http://www.christiangallery.com/WaagnerNecessity.html (displaying interview with man 
praised by anti-abortion movement for sending fake anthrax to women‘s health clinics); Jim 
Kopp‟s Message to America, CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS SERV. (June 7, 2003), 
http://www.christiangallery.com/kopptranscript.htm (displaying a transcript from the trial of 
the man convicted of murdering Dr. Barnett Slepian in Buffalo, New York). 
151 Counter Terrorism List for Abortion Abolitionists, CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS SERV., 
http://www.christiangallery.com/counterterrorism.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (―This list 
contains contact information, when available, for any person who is captured and/or incarce-
rated or currently underground for using force to deter and/or arrest terrorists working to kill, 
maim, or otherwise mutilate God‘s unborn children.‖). 
152 Patrick Johnston, Biblical Justice for Baby-Murderers, CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS 
SERV. (Sept. 18, 2002), http://www.christiangallery.com/biblicaljustice.htm  (referring to the 
killing of a physician who provides abortion services as ―enforcing the law, not breaking it‖). 
153 Pro-Life Nation Launches with Interactive New Tool: AbortionDocs.org, OPERATION 
RESCUE (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.operationrescue.org/archives/pro-life-nation-launches-
with-interactive-new-tool-abortiondocs-org/; see also ABORTIONDOCS.ORG, 
http://abortiondocs.org/disclaimer/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).  
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tionists‖ and 600 ―Surgical Abortion Clinics‖ to ―aid in the end of 
abortion through peaceful, legal means.‖154  However, Operation 
Rescue has a longer history directly associated with ―Wanted‖ post-
ers.155  In 2010, Philip ―Flip‖ Benham, the former director of Opera-
tion Save America (now Operation Rescue), was found guilty and 
sentenced to probation for misdemeanor stalking of a North Carolina 
physician when he blanketed a neighborhood with ―Wanted‖ post-
ers.156 
Such examples, taken together with the publication of infor-
mation that has frequently been correlated with the murder of physi-
cians, come within the reasoning of Justice O‘Connor in Black: 
―[R]egardless of whether the message is a political one or whether 
the message is also meant to intimidate, the burning of a cross is a 
‗symbol of hate.‘  And while cross burning sometimes carries no in-
timidating message, at other times the intimidating message is the on-
ly message conveyed.‖157  The similarities between the history of the 
Ku Klux Klan‘s cross-burnings and the acts of heinous violence 
against individuals targeted by such displays (as discussed by Justice 
O‘Connor), as well as the publication of physicians‘ information on 
the Internet prior to their murder, cannot be denied.158 
Admittedly, the Christian Gallery News Service appears to be 
a fringe publication of the anti-abortion movement, but the content it 
produces has found its way into the mainstream.159  The assault and 
subsequent murder of Dr. George Tiller reflects the dangers of the 
rhetoric used by the fringe of the anti-abortion movement.  Tiller was 
even the subject of widespread targeting by such non-fringe figures 
as Fox News Channel hosts.160  Bill O‘Reilly, a host on the Fox News 
 
                                                                                                                                       
154 Disclaimer, ABORTIONDOCS.ORG, http://abortiondocs.org/disclaimer/ (last visited Jan. 
27, 2013). 
155 See Franco Ordoñez & Courtney Ridenhour, Anti-Abortion Activist Guilty of Stalking 
Charlotte Doctor, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (July 2, 2011), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/07/02/2423347/anti-abortion-activist-guilty.html 
(Phillip ―Flip‖ Benham, former director of Operation Save America, was found guilty of 
stalking a physician after releasing a ―Wanted‖ poster targeting the doctor.). 
156 Id. 
157 Black, 538 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
158 Id.; see also Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1083 (noting that the FBI took physi-
cians‘ appearance on ―Wanted‖ posters as a true threat of impending violence). 
159 See, e.g., The O‟Reilly Factor (Fox News Network television broadcast May 30, 2007) 
(adopting nickname for Dr. Tiller created and used by anti-abortion extremist movement). 
160 Id. 
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Channel, repeatedly referred to Dr. Tiller as ―Tiller the baby killer,‖ 
while discussing whether the physician‘s actions constituted murder 
and trying to relate the topic back to politics.161 
Killing babies, that‘s the subject of this even-
ing‘s ―Talking Points Memo.‖  No matter what you 
think about the abortion issue, you should be very dis-
turbed by what continues to happen in Kansas.  This 
man, Dr. George Tiller, known as Tiller the baby kill-
er, is performing late term abortions without defining 
the specific medical reasons why. . . . Tiller is execut-
ing fetuses . . . .162 
Similarly, in January 2012, a North Carolina state representative 
called for a return to public hangings for murderers and stated that 
―[he] would include abortionists‖ to act as a deterrent to such practic-
es.163  The adoption of extreme statements by individuals in such 
prominent areas further establishes the context with which the trier of 
fact must interpret a statement and the glaring faults inherent in the 
reasonable speaker standard. 
Unlike the reasoning used by the Ninth Circuit, if what consti-
tutes hyperbolic rhetoric versus a true threat can change in the na-
tional context, the reasonable speaker standard obviously fails to be 
objective.164  If a nickname as defamatory as ―the baby killer,‖ com-
monly used by extremist groups, can move from the fringes of abor-
tion activism to a television news program, the position of the rea-
sonable speaker is obviously too malleable.165  The reasonable 
speaker standard also has the potential to fail on a more local level, as 
 
                                                                                                                                       
161 Id.; see also George Tiller—The Baby Killer—Link Page, ARMY OF GOD, 
http://www.armyofgod.com/GeorgeTillerindex.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (arguing that 
George Tiller is akin to Adolf Hitler and that both were guilty of mass murder). 
162 The O‟Reilly Factor, supra note 159 (emphasis added). 
163 Blue Aardvark, NC State Rep: Public Hanging for Abortion Providers, DAILY KOS 
(Jan. 28, 2012), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/01/28/1059346/-NC-State-Rep-Public-
Hangings-for-abortion-providers. 
164 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1075 n.7 (stating that there is not a difference be-
tween the holding of an Eighth Circuit case applying a reasonable listener standard and the 
Ninth Circuit‘s application of a reasonable speaker standard). 
165 The O‟Reilly Factor, supra note 159; see also The O‟Reilly Factor (Fox News Net-
work television broadcast June 4, 2009) (stating that the media was attacking him for charac-
terizing Tiller as a mass murderer, when he was merely stating his ―opinion on his me-
thods‖). 
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can be seen by the recent erosion of reproductive rights by state gov-
ernments throughout the United States.166  For example, in Indiana, 
the state legislature passed a law that greatly restricts access to wom-
en‘s health clinics which provide abortion services by prohibiting 
funding of Planned Parenthood facilities, banning abortions after 
twenty weeks of gestation and requiring that all providers offer wom-
en the opportunity to view an ultrasound before receiving services.167  
Also, in January 2012, an appellate court upheld a Texas law requir-
ing doctors to perform an ultrasound on any woman seeking an abor-
tion prior to performing any procedures.168  Even if the patient refuses 
to view the ultrasound, Texas doctors are required to describe it to the 
patient, unless the woman was impregnated through incest or rape, or 
the fetus is abnormal.169  Similarly, in 2012, Virginia passed a bill re-
quiring that any woman seeking an abortion must undergo an abdo-
minal ultrasound, although the original iteration of the bill called for 
a transvaginal ultrasound.170  Although such actions by elected offi-
cials merely show a great aversion to abortion and a woman‘s right to 
choose, they also show that these measures are supported by the pop-
ulation that elected those state officials. 
Furthermore, as stated by Michael Bray in his rant regarding 
where to place blame for the murder of Dr. George Tiller, many 
people may disagree with or even condemn overt acts of violence 
against physicians.171  Such a stance says nothing about one‘s sympa-
thies for non-violent intimidation tactics, such as ―Wanted‖ posters 
 
                                                                                                                                       
166 See 2011 Mid-Year Legislative Wrap Up, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. 1, 15 (2011), 
http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/state_midyr_wra
pup_2011_8.10.11.pdf (―In at least twenty states, legislation designed to restrict women‘s 
access to reproductive health care and impinge on their constitutional rights has already be-
come law.‖). 
167 Id. at 8. 
168 Terry Baynes, Texas Abortion Law Requiring Doctors to Play Fetal Heart Sounds 
Upheld by Appeals Court, NAT‘L POST (Jan. 10, 2012), http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/ 
01/10/texas-law-requiring-pre-abortion-ultrasound-doesnt-violate-constitution-appeals-
court/. 
169 Id. 
170 Sabrina Tavernise, Virginia: Pre-Abortion Ultrasound Mandate Enacted, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 8, 2012, at A21. 
171 Bray, supra note 43 (―[T]he leaders of the ‗prolife movement‘ and teachers of the 
Scriptures . . . declare such defensive actions to be wrong!  They have refused to consistently 
call abortion murder by affirming the legitimacy of justifiable homicide; i.e. the necessary 
force required to prevent what is called murder.‖). 
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and the Nuremberg Files, used in the effort to end abortion.  By 
adopting a reasonable listener standard, the courts would require the 
trier of fact to look to the impact of the statement upon the target, not 
what a reasonable speaker, who may have great sympathy towards 
those using non-violent, but intimidating, tactics to end abortion, 
would consider to be a true threat in a given location, at a given time. 
Despite the argument presented by the Ninth Circuit that the 
difference between a reasonable speaker and reasonable listener stan-
dard ―does not appear to matter much,‖172 the recent attacks on repro-
ductive rights and previous attacks on those physicians that provide 
access to these rights say otherwise.  A reasonable person in Dr. Til-
ler‘s position, for example, may have had a much different opinion of 
whether the ACLA‘s rhetoric was intended to be threatening than a 
reasonable person who shares the ACLA‘s perspective.  A claim that 
physicians, in the general sense, should suffer or be executed for pro-
viding abortions is clearly hyperbolic rhetoric, but when that rhetoric 
is targeted at a specific physician, the nature, impact, and purpose of 
the statement change drastically. 
When viewed from the perspective of the speaker, the deter-
mination of whether the statement is intended to threaten is too varia-
ble and subject to the sympathies of jurors.  In Alabama, Texas, or 
Oklahoma, one may disagree with the use of force but consider inti-
midation a justified tactic to end abortion practices; in California or 
New York, that view could change drastically.173  When the statement 
is considered from the position of the physician targeted by an ex-
tremist group, on the other hand, jurors are much less likely to con-
sider their own sympathies, and more likely to render a uniform, ob-
jective standard of review and more consistent verdicts.  A 
reasonable listener standard provides plaintiffs with a standard that 
looks to the impact of a statement in context based on how it affects 
those targeted by it, rather than a standard that is largely subject to 
the political and religious views of the region or state in which a 
claim is brought. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
172 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1075 n.7. 
173 See, e.g., supra note 13. 
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VI. STATUTORY REFORM 
With no definition of what constitutes a threat, and minimal 
guidelines as to what constitutes intimidation, the FACE Act does not 
provide the necessary protection to those wronged by extremists 
within the anti-abortion movement, such as the Christian Gallery 
News Service or the ACLA.174  For consistent relief to be granted to 
those targeted and affected by the intimidation tactics of the anti-
abortion movement, the statute must be strengthened by explicitly 
stating what constitutes a threat, defining intent, and expressly calling 
for a reasonable listener standard.  Currently, the FACE Act imposes 
criminal penalties, including imprisonment for a maximum of one 
year for a first offense, three years for a subsequent offense, $10,000 
in fines, up to ten years imprisonment for violations that include vio-
lent acts, and possibly a life sentence if that violent act causes the 
death of another.175  Violation of the FACE Act also opens violators 
to civil liability, including $5,000 in statutory damages per viola-
tion.176  Though strong on its face, the FACE Act falls short of pro-
viding substantive relief to those harmed because it does not provide 
a proper foundation for a claim. 
To strengthen the statute, Congress should add a definition of 
what constitutes a threat.  Enumerating the factors stated in Watts 
would provide both substantive statutory relief to those wronged, as 
well as a clear, explanatory basis for advocacy within the bounds of 
free speech.177  The FACE Act currently defines intimidation as the 
following: ―to place a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily 
harm to him- or herself or to another.‖178  The phrasing of this defini-
tion clearly puts the focus on the recipient of a threat, and any defini-
tion of threat in the statute should explicitly state that a reasonable 
listener standard is to be applied.  For example, a threat could be de-
fined as: Any statement made with the intent to intimidate a person or 
organization that provides abortion services, or a person seeking 
abortion services, using language, that when taken in context, with 
the actor having prior knowledge of that context, would cause a rea-
 
                                                                                                                                       
174 18 U.S.C. § 248(e) (2006). 
175 Id. § 248(b). 
176 Id. § 248(c). 
177 Metz, 780 F.2d at 1002. 
178 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(3). 
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sonable target of such statements to be fearful of bodily harm or 
death to him- or herself or another.  Including the caveat that the ac-
tor has prior knowledge of the context in which the statement was 
made prevents placing strict liability upon one who may be utilizing 
free speech rights without knowledge of the previous crimes perpe-
trated in the name of the anti-abortion movement.  By including these 
minor clarifications, the statute would prevent some of the potential 
subjectivity inherent in the current interpretation of the statute 
through the reasonable speaker standard employed by courts such as 
the Ninth Circuit. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As the Supreme Court elaborated in Brandenburg, Watts, and 
Black, the right to free speech is not absolute and does not provide a 
defense when the speech in question is intended to put another in fear 
for his or her life.179 
The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to al-
low ―free trade in ideas‖––even ideas that the over-
whelming majority of people might find distasteful or 
discomforting. . . .  
The protections afforded by the First Amend-
ment, however, are not absolute, and we have long 
recognized that the government may regulate certain 
categories of expression consistent with the Constitu-
tion.180 
For the anti-abortion movement, the right to protest at women‘s 
health clinics remains unquestioned when it does not physically inter-
fere with access to a clinic.181  That right to protest, though, does not 
include the right to threaten or intimidate another to reach the goal of 
ending abortion.182 
As the Court asserted in Brandenburg, Watts, and Black, 
speech advocating the use of violence to achieve a goal is protected 
 
                                                                                                                                       
179 See Black, 538 U.S. at 358; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. 
180 Black, 538 U.S. at 358.  
181 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(e). 
182 E.g., Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d 1058; Hart, 212 F.3d 1067. 
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when stated generally or as a principle, as do many anti-abortion ex-
tremist groups, when historical context is not taken into considera-
tion.183  The right to live without being in fear of imminent violence 
is fundamental and absolute.184  By comparison, as the Court has 
stated for nearly 100 years, the right of free speech is not absolute.185  
The rhetoric used by organizations such as Operation Rescue and the 
Christian Gallery News Service presents such a circumstance. 
Though the right to display nauseating, and often horrifying, 
images on placards or on websites is protected speech, there is clearly 
a point when actions move from protected speech to true threats, 
which do not receive the protections of the First Amendment.  In 
Hart, the Eighth Circuit, using a reasonable listener standard, found 
that the parking of a cargo truck adjacent to a women‘s health clinic 
was a true threat.186  What would otherwise be an innocent act was 
transformed, in this case the mere parking of a vehicle, to a true 
threat, attempting to bomb the clinic, which is clear due to historical 
context and the effect the action had on the employees of that clin-
ic.187 
Unfortunately, in Planned Parenthood, by putting the focus 
on the speaker, the Ninth Circuit adopted a standard that allows for 
negative views of abortion and sympathies towards the use of intimi-
dation as a viable tactic to stop abortion to fog the judgment of jurors.  
Just as in Black, where a cross was placed and lit on an African-
American man‘s property, a person is justified in expecting consis-
tency in the determination of whether such speech is meant to intimi-
date or threaten.188  By adopting a reasonable speaker standard, the 
 
                                                                                                                                       
183 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; Watts, 394 U.S. at 707 (―What is a threat must be dis-
tinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.‖); Black, 538 U.S. at 359. 
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not per-
mit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. 
Id. (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
184 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (stating that threats which 
create a ―fear of violence [and] the possibility that the threatened violence will occur‖ are not 
protected by the First Amendment). 
185 See supra notes 15-46; Schenk, 249 U.S. 47. 
186 Hart, 212 F.3d at 1072. 
187 Id. (―These circumstances . . . were reasonably interpreted by clinic staff and police 
officers as a threat to injure.‖). 
188 Black, 538 U.S. at 350. 
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Ninth Circuit precludes any such consistency.  Consistency may nev-
er be guaranteed, but the adoption of a reasonable listener standard 
and its addition to the FACE Act is one step closer to such a goal.  To 
allow political and religious beliefs to play a role in the determination 
of whether a statement targeting a physician in the context of a histo-
ry of horrific violence is untenable and unjust. 
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